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ABSTRACT
The increasing concentration of population around the cities poses challenges in
their operation and services. On the other hand, the current technological revolution al-
lows scalable and innovative means to better serve the public. Many city governments
are collecting, publishing and analyzing more data from diverse sources including IoT
sensors. City government’s open data provides multiple values such as improving trans-
parency of the government, enhancing the efficiency of its operations and services and
attracting more businesses to the region. However, the resulting data systems, called
Open Data Portals (ODPs) become more complicated and create the issues of accessibil-
ity, security, and privacy.
Extensive analyses of ODPs of many cities around the world using diverse method-
ologies have been performed. We find that the extent of openness of data and popularity,
and the level of security of ODPs are highly diverse across the cities. We then provide
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the recommendations for improving security measures of ODPs. Considering the privacy
issues of data in ODPs, we provide a tool to automatically filtering Personally Identifiable
Information (PII).
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CHAPTER 1
INTRODUCTION
As the population in different cities and the general state of technology are cor-
related, it is becoming more challenging to manage and control these cities to provide
the acceptable level of services. Including traffic and parking issue many other strategic
problems that still need effective solutions such as the utilities (water, electricity, waste
management etc.). These needs raised the idea of finding an automated and effective way
to capture and measure the real usage for long periods of time by using sensors, such as
camera, data traffic sensor, pollution sensor, light sensor, vibration sensor, temperature
sensor, etc. Data from different sources are published in ODP (Open Data Portal) and are
faster and easier to access, even across national boundaries.
There are multiple benefits of making city data available publicly. The govern-
ment transparency greatly enhances the ability of policymakers and scientists to complex
development problems. It can also help finding effective solutions for cities problem as
this data can be analyzed by the services vendors to provide better service quality, as they
can use these real measurements to find effective solutions for their future planning and
load balancing. In addition, the open data is an effective means to attract business and de-
velopment investors as they can realize how they can spot specific city issues and provide
a service (or solution) in an efficient way. It also shows how a particular city is developed
and transparent [11]. The captured data usually contains sensitive and private information
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such as people locations, faces, cars license plates, addresses, phone numbers, etc. There-
fore, the data needs to be filtered before releasing it to the public to maintain the people
information privacy and security. Examples of the captured data and what sensitive infor-
mation may contain are provided in the table 1.
Table 1: Data captured, sensor type, and possible sensitive information
Data Source Captured Data Sensitive Info
Traffic camera Video record Faces, Car license plate, Location
DHCP server Connection info
Device type, MAC, Location, OS,
Carrier
Police reports Crime records
Addresses, Phone numbers,
Names, PII
In this work, an analysis of 10 ODPs for 10 cities around the world is conducted
to identify the strength and weakness areas for each and what are the common system en-
vironments that are being used. Our selection for these cities based in seeking to include
local and international diversity as possible, including the cities of reliable and complete
log records, and selecting the cities which their comparison metrics are available (classifi-
cation) such as datasets. The findings can help any new smart city or open data initiative,
or even any already established smart cities to see what are the trends and how they can
improve their weaknesses comparing to other cities considering the city size and popula-
tion to find the best city match.
The Open Data Portals (ODP) are web applications that are directly connected to
the governmental data servers where the data stored, filtered, and posted to the public.
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That means the traffic between the ODP and the server contains very important informa-
tion about the server side, further this traffic represents an access point to these servers.
Therefore, any traffic from/to/through the ODP must be secure and monitored. Even
though the data content that is published on these portals is not confidential, but at least
its integrity (correctness) is crucial. Further, this data is used for a high level of strategic
planning or in the research field that will be relied on, so the data integrity must be pro-
tected. Protecting the security of smart city and the economic value is becoming more
critical [26].
In this work, first, the analysis is carried out for the smart city system and pro-
vide detailed explanations for its subsystems in terms of topology, interconnecting, and
functionality. It is to provide the in-depth understanding of ODPs and smart city systems
starting from the data source (i.e., sensors) up to the data portal interfaces. The analysis of
the ODPs for 10 cities around the world is by identifying the essential metrics to evaluate
the quality and the performance of any ODP. Then, the measures of the most important
metrics for the cities such as the number of visits and the population has been taken. Fur-
ther, apply an in-depth analysis to explain these results in a meaningful representation.
For example, the number of visits can represent indications for how popular an ODP is,
how relevant contents it has, how much interests the city draws from various entities such
as individuals, companies, businesses. Finally identifying the issues of privacy and se-
curity of the cities ODPs and propose the best possible technical solutions based on the
ODPs system types.
3
CHAPTER 2
RELATED WORK
2.1 Background
The quality and value of ODPs significantly depend on the datasets. Not only the
types and duration of data but also their organization and the possibility of classification
or filtering are integral to serve its purpose. Data organized in a way that is easy to access,
search, and classify would increase its utility. Quality metrics for ODPs are discussed
in [12], that includes the presence of metadata to enable users to search, filter, classify the
data in an efficient way. The issue becomes more significant, as the volume of data gets
increased. ODP administrators may exclude any unorganized data form ODP, as open
datasets would be difficult to manage if the metadata is missing or wrong.
There are studies that compare and rank the city ODPs by designing quantifying
indices, such as [12, 17, 27, 32]. However, these indices do not consistently present fair
comparisons across for all the ODPs, because the cities practice diverse ways in how they
aggregate the datasets classification, population, and the audience interests and the level
of the city development vary.
2.2 State of Art
Several data platforms (PaaS) used for governments and public sector institutions
have been compared in [2]. Most of them use cloud-based services, and they include
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Ckan [14], Dkan [22], Junar [23], Socrata [29], Prognoz [24], and Opendatasoft [19].
During the study, these platforms were identified to provide a very much similar type
of services in terms of functionality, access and control levels. While those cloud-based
data platforms may be similar, the quality of ODPs depend on the ODP administrators
in making their service interface (ODP) efficient, powerful, rich in content, and regularly
updated. It is similar to the analogy between a web hosting service (i.e data platform
provider such as Socrata) and a website developer (i.e. ODP administrator).
In [27], the authors discuss the need for standard features and requirements of
ODPs and present their effort to provide a generic, effective and unified framework for
ODPs in HOMER Project [8].
As the data is being collected from different types of sources and sensors, then
it will be transferred through a networking media to the main data center (sometimes a
storage cloud). The captured raw data often contain personal and private information
of the citizens, thus it is very important to filter or even anonymize the information in
order to prevent leaking the citizens’ PII [34]. The administrators have the control of
access to the stored raw data, so they format, filter, and then publish the filtered data on
an ODP [10]. As ensuring the private information is a must, an effective and automatic
filtration method needs to be used [34].
A thorough analysis was performed by testing the actual traffic for all the ODPs
and considering the functionality, the structure, and the content of the ODP. This consid-
eration allowed us to identify a list of the most dangerous and common vulnerabilities
that any ODP. Actual multi-method tests were applied to all the targeted ODPs to address
5
the weaknesses and the strengths as well. A quantifying evaluation is provided for all the
cities based on the security practices detected by our tests.
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CHAPTER 3
SMART CITY OPEN DATA SYSTEM INTERNETWORKING
3.1 Smart City Open Data Ecosystem
Smart city open data ecosystem: In conventional open data portal (shown in Fig-
ure 1), government and different departments collect data from citizens and upload col-
lected data to the portal directly, so there are fewer security vulnerabilities and filtration of
personal information is easier. However, smart cities open data portal is quite complex as
an infrastructure as well as the data flow. Figure 2 is an illustration of the smart city open
data ecosystem. In the smart city, ODP sensors, citizens, and different city departments
(police department, fire department, emergency medical service, 311 call, housing and
others) are the basic data source. Some are directly connected to ODP as a source also
as a user, and some are (like sensors) using network infrastructure to upload data to the
portal. 3rd party data analytic organization does the analysis of data from ODP for the
business decision, policymakers also for the government. Even in most of the cases, 3rd
Figure 1: Conventional open data system
Figure 2: Smart city open data ecosystem
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party handles the open data portal itself (like Socrata is one of the popular data handlers
in US ODPs). Involvement of different network provider and 3rd party data analytic orga-
nization makes the smart city open data ecosystem more vulnerable in different aspects.
Therefore, smart city open data ecosystem requires more and complex security system to
prevent unauthorized data leakage and requires privacy insurance at different levels.
3.2 Smart City System Internetworking: Revenue Sharing
Smart city system usually controls many of the critical services in the city such as
utilities, traffic flow, and sometimes not critical services such as weather forecast, guid-
ance services for tourists, and so on. Kansas Smart City officials and their technical staffs
gave us a clear depiction of the smart city System-of-Systems. This system includes a
mix for both of the public and private sectors as they integrate their resources to pro-
vide several specific intelligent services such as smart lighting, open Wi-Fi, information
Kiosks, and so on. The vendors participating in Kansas Smart City are Cisco, Google,
Sprint, Sensity (Verizon), ThinkBig and others. Cisco is providing the controlling nodes
for the networking such as switches, routers, APs, Datacenter cloud (i.e. CDP). Google
is providing the networking links infrastructure through Google Fiber. Sprint provides
the open Wi-Fi in Kansas City, using the infrastructure of Cisco and Google. Sensity is
providing the smart lightening, using the infrastructure of Cisco and Google. ThinkBig is
accessing the raw data captured by the smart city system (in Cisco CDP cloud storage) to
filter, process, analyze, and publish it. Cisco is providing the Networking infrastructure
and Sprint is operating part of it to provide the open Wi-Fi in Kansas City downtown
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area. Sprint is collecting statistical data from the network user’s devices to improve their
services.
Data flow between the data storage and each of smart services sensors is not bidi-
rectional, as a result, raw data are only flowing from sensors to storage cloud but they are
not able to pull it back. Other smart services can access a filtered version of these data to
provide their smart services. Smart city components are using the cloud resources which
are very efficient usually. However, in some cases private organization keeping a copy of
the captured data from sensors for their analysis, which can be a security issue.
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CHAPTER 4
SMART CITY OPEN DATA SYSTEM SECURITY
4.1 Raised Issues and Background
The OPDs are web-based applications that are serving as an interface for visitors
to send requests to the database engine on the open data. These portals are becoming more
popular and their content is growing rapidly, so more types of visitors are accessing them
using different connection types such as HTTP and API. The ODPs are containing a wide
variety of information sets, such as crime incidents, utility outages, traffic information,
and so on. As the ODP publishes the records of a city size, therefore it is important to use
efficient automated methods to collect the data, filter, and format it to make it ready for
publishing on the ODP. The collected data usually contain confidential information such
as the personal identification and contact information of the people who are included in
any record that the smart city or the open data database is collecting. Therefore, a filtration
step is required to be done in an efficient and smart way. Let’s take an example of someone
who is filling an online form to report a violation or incident close to their home or their
neighbor. It happened that a person to mention a private information in the More-Details
box such as names, phone numbers, birth dates, car records, full addresses, and so on.
This report will be saved to some database that the open data system has access to. If
the open data system filters the columns of the private data and not scanning every single
column such as the More-Details column, then all that column content will be published
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with its private information. This is a privacy issue that we will be discussing in a later
chapter.
As the ODP is an interactive interface between the visitors and the database en-
gine of the open data system which is connected to the row and unfiltered data, further,
the ODP is a part of the smart city system which is connected normally to very sensitive
governmental systems such as the police records, the traffic control system, etc. There-
fore, the ODP can be considered as a possible access point to many sensitive systems, so
it needs to be secured. Further, as the ODP visitors numbers are in a rapid increase, then
ODPs can be used to compromise or attack these visitors if these ODPs have not been
secured.
The ODP content is used in analyzing city problems and needs for the future
planning and big size of possible projects of investments and development. Therefore,
the integrity of the ODPs is important.
The ODPs availability and accessibility are important for whoever is connected to
them to pull data and especially the API connections that are used in real time applications
and websites that provide real-time services such as the traffic status, the weather, the
crime information and so no. So, the ODPs availability is important and need to be
maintained and protected from any possible attacks that affect their availability such as
DDoS attacks.
Research Scope: Based on the ODP classification as web-based application,
we started to study the web-based application security issues and focusing on the most
common ten web applications vulnerabilities that are; Injection, Broken Authentication
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and Session Management, Cross-Site Scripting (XSS), Broken Access Control, Security
Misconfiguration, Sensitive Data Exposure, Insufficient Attack Protection, Cross-Site Re-
quest Forgery (CSRF), Using Components with Known Vulnerabilities, and Underpro-
tected APIs. Next, we narrow our scope to only six of these ten security issues that are
related to the ODPs functionalists. For example, the Broken Access Control is a secu-
rity issue that can affect the web-based applications such as email web applications and
e-commerce and online shopping but it is not important for the ODPs. The six security
issues that are specific to ODPs are; Injection, Sensitive Data Exposure, Broken Authen-
tication and Session Management, Cross-Site Scripting (XSS), Using Components with
Known Vulnerabilities, and Underprotected APIs.
Investigation area: To investigate the above six security issues we have two in-
vestigation areas. First, is looking at a higher level of the application which is the browser
level which includes the client side only. Second, is the deeper level of the communica-
tion protocol which includes all of the server side, networking phase, and the client side.
Securing the higher level applications such as the browsers is not ultimate solution as this
thing depends on many factors that are significantly varying such as, the browser type and
version, the operating system, the security applications used, and the client awareness
for security issues. So securing at high levels is not a stable and rigid solution. Instead,
we prefer to investigate and find a solution in a deeper level such as the communication
protocol (i.e. HTTP) and make the server enforce the solution so it will include all of
the server side, the networking medium, and the client side. Therefore, we investigated
how we can secure the communication protocol which is the HTTP so that we can secure
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these six ODPs related security issues. We found that there are many security settings
and practices that can be applied to avoid these security issues, mainly including; setting
the related security HTTP settings (flags), and utilizing and integrating these settings with
the programming side of the ODP. The related HTTP security settings are; XSS injec-
tion protection and Defense-In-Depth with Content Security Policy, Broken Authentica-
tion and Session, Management with Cookies Security and privacy and X-XSS-Protection,
Cross-origin Resource Sharing, HTTP Public Key Pinning, HTTP Strict Transport Se-
curity, Redirection, Referrer Policy, Subresource Integrity, X-Content-Type-Options, and
X-Frame-Options.
Evaluating the security settings for ten ODPs: We used several methods to test
the security settings for each ODP of the ten ODPs, and then we quantified these settings
to be able to compare the ten ODPs.
4.2 Security Analysis Methodology
We analyzed the HTTP traffic interactions (requests and responses) between the
client and the ODP server to find out the setting values of these flags. We are listing
and explaining in this chapter all the methods that we used in our investigation. The
most important, frequent, and up-to-the-date security vulnerabilities that can the ODP’s
have were targeted. Later in this section, these vulnerabilities will be explained with the
possible risks behind them and the most successful solutions for these security gaps. By
considering two concepts essentially in our analysis; the most dangerous, and frequent
vulnerabilities, and the HTTP specific vulnerabilities.
13
• Running security tests: Several security tests such as SUCURI [31], SSL Labs [30],
Quttera [25], Site Guarding [7], and Web Inspector [9], that are specialized for web
applications to test the web traffic security related information.
• HTTP Header analysis:
• cURL analysis with C/C++:
• Sniffing the HTTP traffic with raw web sockets: Raw sockets programming is the
deepest and accurate method to capture the network traffic for all the network layers.
it can be considered the lowest levels method. Because they provide the direct
access to the network traffic data units (frames, packets, segments) by capturing the
incoming ones and generating the outgoing ones. It is a huge number of data units
that can be captured by the raw sockets so it is a difficult task. Further, analyzing
the incoming packets is much more difficult, so the well-known software Wireshark
is used to capture the incoming traffic that is originating from the ODP’s. the main
interest is in a specific traffic that belongs to the HTTP protocol and especially the
HTTP traffic that manages the connection between the client and the ODP server.
To do that I used very precise filters to the traffic captured by the raw sockets to
focus and analyze that traffic we are interested in.
With this method, it is possible to see the traffic in the bit level up to the original
information such as the HTTP flags that set the connection specification. Based
on the ODP server setup that is used we can identify the security strengths and
weaknesses and even predict the possible risks as it will be discussed in detail later
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in this section.
• Remote Access: The normal way for any client to access a file or page on any web
server is by using any web browser that all using the HTTP protocol. However, to
manage the server remotely it is very common to use an SSH connection with the
proper credentials to change the configuration or updating any content based on the
privilege level of the user credentials. The security issue in this connection can raise
in two common usages. First, when SSHing any server with the wrong credentials,
the default reaction for the server is by replying an access error but with accurate
and up to date information about the server such as the server’s operating system
type, distribution, and the version. This is the first successful step of any hacking
operation which can lie under reconnaissance phase, which can lead to identifying
the security vulnerabilities for that server which leads to ’Using Components with
Known Vulnerabilities’ problem that is discussed later in more detail. The second
security issue is that when accessing any file or page on the server using SSH con-
nection it will show the content source code and the protocol header information
which includes the connection setup including the security setup, such as the HTTP
security flags.
• Fetching the HTTP traffic by the browser-level tools and addons: As the most
important communication that OPD’s using is HTTP that is established by the web
browsers. the web browsers at the client end are applying very deep analysis for the
HTTP traffic to present the web content in an appropriate way that the web server
specifying. therefore, web browsers are able to provide a great level of the traffic
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of the ODP’s. Most of the major web browsers (such as Firefox, Chrome, Internet
Explorer, etc) are providing a collection of sophisticated development tools that are
very helpful for web developers. this collection usually includes a traffic analysis
tool that focuses mainly on the HTTP traffic and the bandwidth consumption for
the active sessions.
- Browsers built-in tools: Firefox is equipped with a very useful tool that pro-
vides a comprehensive collection of real-time measures and traffic information such
as a detailed and organized view for the HTTP request and responds headers and
their flags with a briefed hints about the interesting values as figure 23 showing
a screenshot for it. Chrome is providing less sophisticated developer tools set es-
pecially in the networking part that provide only a very limited information about
the HTTP traffic as figure 4 is showing a screenshot of it. Microsoft Edge is pro-
viding lightweight set of tools that are well organized and providing very useful
networking tool that presents real-time HTTP information including some of the
HTTP flags values as figure 5 showing is a screenshot of it.
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Figure 3: Firefox Network Analyzer
Figure 4: Chrome Network Analyzer
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Figure 5: Microsoft Edge Network Analyzer
- Third party specialized add-ons: Live HTTP is one of the add-ons that can be
used effectively in both Firefox and Chrome web browsers which provides most
of the important HTTP traffic setup details in an organized and easy to read way.
HttpFox is another web browser add-on that is compatible with Firefox only but it
provides great details about the HTTP traffic and especially the headers flags with
a very easy way to read and understand the flags values in addition to other features
such as pausing and filtering the captured traffic. Figure 6 is showing screenshots
of both add-ons
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(a) HttpFox add-on
(b) Live HTTP add-on
Figure 6: Third party web browsers add-ons
4.3 Top Ranked Web Security Vulnerabilities
Since the ODP’s are considered as database web applications, then a key security
factor is the communication protocol which is HTTP (Hyper Text Transfer Protocol).
This protocol plays the main role about how the web application behaves in; the server
side (the web and database server(s)), client-side (the browser or API requests), and the
communications in between them (the network). We did a research to identify the most
dangerous and frequent web security vulnerabilities, so we found that The Open Web
Application Security Project [20] (OWASP) 2017 report is containing the major part of
them:
• Injection
• Broken Authentication and Session Management
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• Cross-Site Scripting (XSS)
• Broken Access Control
• Security Misconfiguration
• Sensitive Data Exposure
• Insufficient Attack Protection
• Cross-Site Request Forgery (CSRF)
• Using Components with Known Vulnerabilities
• Underprotected APIs
4.4 HTTP Security Vulnerabilities
HTTP is the application layer protocol that web traffic uses and it is very exposed
to the users’ end and they are familiar with it. that makes it easy to read (or sniff), and easy
to modify it or control it with high-level programming languages and no deep knowledge
needed usually. In fact, HTTP has two types of important information; the data transferred
by the HTTP protocol and the HTTP connection information. Both of these categories
need to be secure. Simply, the data is being transferred by the HTTP protocol usually can
be confidential or at least its integrity is important, so encrypting this type is important.
the encrypted version of HTTP is HTTPS that encrypt the data and matches a signature
between the connection ends. The other part of the HTTP information is the connection
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information, that part is called the HTTP header. The HTTP header contains very impor-
tant information such as the configuration and setup used of the connection established
between the client and the server. each part of this information is separated in a specific
field inside the HTTP header. in this analysis, we will describe in detail the HTTP header
fields that are directly related to security settings, and how we already used these fields
in our analyses to find out what web security vulnerabilities can exist in the open data
portals that we targeted in our study.
4.5 Content Security Policy (CSP)
Among all the flags mentioned above, many of them that are security related
HTTP parameters or flags. We investigated to find out the most relevant and effective
parameters.
XSS and Defense-In-Depth: To make sure that the client that is requesting a web
page content from a web server will receive the right contents (page, files, etc) and all its
dependencies (fonts, styling files, scripts libraries/files, etc). sometimes, the dependencies
are loaded from a third-party server(s)/website(s). for example, requesting a page from
a tutorials website that contains a video from youtube.com, a bootstrap styling file from
w3schools.com, and a font file from one of Google servers. In this example, the client side
will receive files from four different sources, so how clients make sure that all these files
are from these sources only? If a client is not sure then hackers are using this vulnerability
to inject a malicious script (JavaScript mainly, VBScript, ActiveX, and Flash) that will
load into clientaˆs browser and execute at their end, and usually, it will send a sensitive
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information back to the hacker such as a cookie session information. Such scripts can be
injected into the clientaˆs browser within (but not limited to); script, body, img, iframe,
input, link, table, div, and object tags. For example, the img-src attribute of the element
img can be changed to any malicious value or file address. To make sure that the web
session interaction happening between the right ends a strict list (or whitelist) of all the
servers that are needed to be involved in that session must be identified in advance by
the web server. These set of policies are represented by the CSP HTTP parameter. This
vulnerability can include any of cross-site scripting, injection, sensitive data exposure, and
broken authentication and session management of the ODP specific web vulnerabilities
listed in the next.
4.6 XSS and Defense-In-Depth Prevention
The strict white list method: BY adding the nonce attribute to any of both script
and style elements. It will hold a nonce unique authorization value. The nonce value
can be generated by any programming language function that supports cryptographically
strong random function such as Python. Now, each of these elements has its own unique
authenticator that must match the ones that are listed in the CSP policy that is set on the
web server. In this case, any unauthenticated element or attribute will not pass to the
client. This method is more accurate than just identifying a whitelist of ULRaˆs for the
servers that are involved in the web request as if the client uses lax CSS parsing algorithm
it still possible that a malicious style sheet can be grabbed by the user agent parameter.
XSS Prevention: The strict white list method: BY adding the nonce attribute to
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any of both script and style elements. It will hold a nonce unique authorization value.
The nonce value can be generated by any programming language function that supports
cryptographically strong random function such as Python. Now, each of these elements
has its own unique authenticator that must match the ones that are listed in the CSP policy
that is set at the web server. In this case, any unauthenticated element or attribute will not
pass to the client. This method is more accurate than just identifying a whitelist of ULRaˆs
for the servers that are involved in the web request as if the client uses lax CSS parsing
algorithm it still possible that a malicious style sheet can be grabbed by the user agent
parameter.
This vulnerability can include any of Cross-Site Scripting, Injection, Sensitive Data Ex-
posure, and Broken Authentication and Session Management of the ODP specific web
vulnerabilities listed in the next.
As these tags can be found in any part of the web page, very useful recommendations
were delivered by Open Web Application Security Project (OWASP).
• Never Insert Untrusted Data Except in Allowed Locations
• HTML Escape Before Inserting Untrusted Data into HTML Element Content
• Attribute Escape Before Inserting Untrusted Data into HTML Common Attributes
• JavaScript Escape Before Inserting Untrusted Data into JavaScript Data Values
• CSS Escape And Strictly Validate Before Inserting Untrusted Data into HTML
Style Property Values.
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• URL Escape Before Inserting Untrusted Data into HTML URL Parameter Values
• Sanitize HTML Markup with a Library Designed for the Job
• Prevent DOM-based XSS
• Use HTTPOnly cookie flag
• Implement Content Security Policy
• Use an Auto-Escaping Template System
• Use the X-XSS-Protection Response Header
Web server configuration: we are providing important steps for setting this pa-
rameter based on what the web server is using to set the security policies: Note: these
steps may change slightly when any of the frameworks updates. Also, the web server
administrator can add their own customized CSP rules based on their need. The selected
web servers are the top three that are being used globally according to [16].
Apache:
Access the file httpd.conf as root user and add the following rule setting:
Header set Content-Security-Policy ”default-src ’self’;”
IIS:
Add the following to the HTTP response Headers for any specific site:
Name: Content-Security-Policy
Value: default-src ’self’
Nginx:
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In the nginx.conf file, add:
add header Content-Security-Policy ”default-src ’self’;”;
Second, Defense-In-Depth, User-Agent, and Content Injection: The concept
of Defense-In-Depth is to build multiple layers security barriers to increase the protection
level for the whole system. This principle came from the fact that the totally secure sys-
tem is a system that has zero functionality (totally disconnected and powered off) [28]
Information Security, Managing Risk with Defense in Depth. Therefore, an acceptable
security level for a system at several stages is the best solution to provide diverse protec-
tion framework that provides integrity, confidentiality, and accessibility of the system and
the data. As mentioned before, the whole idea of the CSP is to identify the safe and right
source(s) that can be used in any web traffic session. That means the source identification
and the infection detection can be effectively applied to the element, file, and directory
level that is needed to run a web application file through the session. Based on that, we
can say that CSP authentication and detection scopes are element, file, and directory. So
it can tell if any of those is coming from the web server (or any of its aliases) or not, but
simply it cants tells if the web element is infected or not. Based on this fact, and to obtain
the best results, the web developer should avoid using inline scripts and styles as the CSP
cant identify the infection at this level.
If the web content does not contain such vulnerable structure, then that maximum utiliza-
tion of the CSP can be achieved and used by setting the needed policies by the web server
and include that information in the response HTTP header to inform the user agent of the
client’s browsers to use the safe and actual contents during the active sessions and avoid
25
using any injected and/or fake contents [33]. The user agent is responsible for specifying
what files and elements from the web server will be called and used to respond to the
client’s request, based on the client’s browser and device.
Succeeding in applying such protection technique would lead to create a very effective
networking protection layer that is deep to the networking layer level which is applied
even before the malicious content can be involved in the HTTP protocol session rather
than detecting it by higher level protection tools when the malicious content is already
transferred over the network, buffered, and defragmented at the clients memory. This
protection layer is considered as one of the Defense-In-Depth effusive methods, as it
presents an effective protective layer on the networking protocol level.
4.7 ODP Specific Web Vulnerabilities
Based on the functionality and the construction of the OPD’s we selected the ap-
plicable web vulnerabilities that might affect the security of the ODP.
• Injection: Injection vulnerabilities, such as SQL, NoSQL, OS, and LDAP injec-
tions, occur when untrusted or malicious queries (also called smart queries), such
as user input to some web based application, is sent to the database engine inter-
preter.Attacker’s can access confidential or sensitive data by tricking the database
interpreter to execute these inputs as unintended commands. Simply, the database
engine interpreter will understand these inputs as commands instead of just data to
be saves in the database.
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• Sensitive Data Exposure: Web applications forms must properly protect confiden-
tial information, such as financial, healthcare, and PII. Gainign access to such insuf-
ficiently secured information is a mean reason for credit card fraud, identity theft,
etc.
• Broken Authentication and Session Management: Several sensitive services and
information that require solid authentication methods. The common cased where
the authentication credentials can be compromised are when sending the credentials
over weakly or not encrypted connection, or by accessing the access authentication
session data which is the cookies.
• Cross-Site Scripting (XSS): This case will occur when a user request some content
from the web and an attacker inject or replace some malicious content within the
response. The user will receive this malicious content and compile it by his or her
browser causing a security issue. This can happen when the user does not validate
the response content for his or her request.
• Using Components with Known Vulnerabilities: Attacker job will be much easier
when they target a well known server. In general, knowing what components the
target is using such as libraries, frameworks, and so on will let the attacker knowing
all these components vulnerabilities and default values and settings. For example,
if a host is running a FTP server, then we can easily gues that port number 21 is
open and can interact with any incoming FTP connection on that port.
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• Underprotected APIs: Application programming interface (API) is considered a de-
veloper level connection method in which the client sends specific requests to fetch
data from the ODP database. Many developers allow the client to request from the
application or the website without any restrictions. As the ODPs contain a huge
amount of data saved as a big size of files, so it is possible for a request can retrieve
a big file of several Gigabytes. If many clients launched such requests at the same
time then it can perform a DDoS attack keeping the server busy for a period of time
trying to process these giant requests. In some cases, the client would be able to
send information to the API server if it is not protected with an efficient authenti-
cation method. Our recommendations to avoid such cases by limiting the request
size and how many times that a client can request based on the MAC address or
the IP. Another method to apply an efficient authentication method is by asking the
clients to create an account with sufficient identification information and showing
the purpose of accessing the data and provide the client after approving his request
with a unique identifier that must be included and verified in each API request the
client does.
4.8 ODP Security Comparison For 10 Cities
Here, the most important and variant web traffic security factors have been com-
pared. We included in our comparison the analysis for the following areas:
• XSS injection protection and Defense-In-Depth with Content Security Policy
• Broken Authentication and Session Management with Cookies Security and privacy
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and X-XSS-Protection
• Cross-origin Resource Sharing
• HTTP Public Key Pinning
• HTTP Strict Transport Security
• Redirection
• Referrer Policy
• Subresource Integrity
• X-Content-Type-Options
• X-Frame-Options
Therefore, our multi-method results for all the 10 cities is concluded in Table 2
Security index formulation and calculation: The evaluation values are out of 100
for each city, and each one is a combination for measuring eleven different web security
metrics. The security level score is computed as below.
m = 10× (b− w)/b (4.1)
I =
∑
i∈M
mi
|M | (4.2)
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Where M is the set of security factors and mi is a normalized individual secu-
rity factor. M includes Content Security Policy, Cookies, Cross-origin Resource Shar-
ing, HTTP Public Key Pinning, HTTP Strict Transport Security, Redirection, Referrer
Policy, Sub-resource Integrity, X-Content-Type-Options, X-Frame-Options, and X-XSS-
Protection. The individual security factors are normalized using the values of worst and
best security configuration values. w is the worst security configuration value, and b is
the best security configuration value. When the security metric is set to the basic default
setting without considering security, we consider this as a very potential security vulner-
ability as any security setup should be confidential to avoid the common security issue
of Using Components with Known Vulnerabilities. The worst configuration case is rep-
resenting a big negative impact as it can cause functionality issue due to incompatibility,
and security risk. The sum of normalized individual security levels for all factors consid-
ered is the score of security setting of an ODP. (See Equation4.2). We found that ODPs
vary significantly in their security settings. Due to the space limitation, we only show the
three prominent cases of ODPs among the cities we considered. The security scores of
Chicago, Dubai and Kansas City are shown in Figures 7, 8 and 9, respectively.
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Figure 7: ODP security metric scores for Chicago
Figure 8: ODP security metric scores for Dubai
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Figure 9: ODP security metric scores for Kansas City
Table 2: ODP’s privacy and security comparison
City Name
Security
Evaluation
Network
Security
Data Security
Privacy
Compliance
Chicago 82 4 4 8
Kansas City 73 2 3 5
Los Angeles 82 3 3 6
New York 54 2 2 4
Washington DC 63 2 2 4
Casablanca 46 2 2 4
Barcelona 36 2 2 4
Dubai 27 2 2 4
Seoul 32 3 2 5
London 82 3 3 6
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CHAPTER 5
SMART CITY OPEN DATA (SCOD) OPENNESS
SCOD openness refers to how a city is open to its citizens and the entire world
by providing accurate, reliable, periodic information through its ODP. This openness is
a significant indication of whether a city is well connected, utilizing latest technologies,
transparent, and interested in research and development. In [6] a representation of a
method to measure the openness of any open data portal based on the availability of the
required supporting data. [18] (The Open Data Barometer) is a web application that
ranks the countries openness based on the overall open data available online. When a
city provides its records to its ODP that allows many great impact parties such as the
analysts, technology vendors, and local or foreign citizens to see it clearly. Analysts such
as academic researchers can use this actual city records to analyze it and discover the
city problems and provide feasible solutions for them. Technology vendors will be more
confident to invest and provide solutions that are fitting the city needs by analyzing its
open data. A City can be more transparent to its citizens by showing them what data the
city is collecting. Citizens from outside the city or who are not familiar with the city can
find the piece of the information that they need to make important decisions in their life,
such as finding the proper neighbourhood to move in based on several metrics such as the
crime rate, the education level of its educational institutes, and the abandoned buildings.
Further, citizens will be aware of the major and frequently occurring issues in any specific
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neighborhood.
Analysis tools and technique: A very valuable information piece of any website
is the traffic records, such as the number of visits per a specific period of time. This
information is crucial to measure the accessibility and find out the size of the expected
traffic. The value of these records is going higher when it going older, so it can show a
larger range of the portal traffic history, which is an essential detail that can be used to
evaluate and determine several important the portal performance and activity, such as;
• The traffic (i.e. visits, data download requests, visits duration) size and if it has any
seasonal trend so it would be caused by some incident, a development, or change
that caused the increase or decrease
• What is the most important information that the ODP visitors are interested in so
it can be updated constantly and more precisely. For instance, we found that for
Kansas City the top five keywords that were the Kansas City ODP looking for are;
KC water, Kansas City water, KCMO water (KCMO refers to Kansas City Missouri
as Kansas City has both Missouri and Kansas states sides), Kansas water services,
and Kansas City parcel viewer. Figure 10 shows the number of the for all the ten
ODPs during the last 30 days. From this figure we can say that the cities of a higher
population (Chicago and Los Angeles) are scoring high numbers of visits, however,
Washington DC and Seattle are scoring the highest. by looking closer, Washington
DC is attracting very high attention as it is the capital of the United States, also
Seattle is scoring high because of their wide initiatives and activities towards the
smart city and open data [4]. Another interesting measure is shown in Figure 11
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which shows more precise metric that is how many pages each visitor is visiting.
This metric can indicate how visitors are engaged to a certain ODP. Figure 11
also gives a time trend view for the ten cities and we can say that there is no clear
one. However, we can see a clear peak for London City during the second week
of November when the 3ie London Evidence Week taking place which is several
public activities to focus about the city challenges based on the actual evidence [5].
• Who is visiting the ODP (in terms of the gender, education, and age). An interesting
indicator is the age which is shown in Figure 12 as it divides the ODPs visitors age
(from 18 to 65+) into six groups. In the academic world, we can classify that, 18 to
24 are the undergraduate students, 25 to 44 are the graduate students, and 45 to 64
are the scholars such as professors and Ph.D. candidates. Based on this classifica-
tion, it is clear that the 25 to 44 group is dominating the ODP visits records. This
can be strongly justified by assuming that the graduate students are representing a
major group who targets the open data topic and doing research on it.
• How a certain ODP is popular by measuring its reputation of what websites are
directing to an ODP such as a search engine, somewhat social media website, or
a link from a well-known website. Figure 13 shows the percentage of the traffic
source for the ODPs visitors which means that the previous page was visited by
the visitor prior to visiting the ODP page. It is clear that the social networks are
the smallest source for the ODP traffic, however, the search engines are the larger
traffic source.
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We have used a number of web analytics tools from Google Analytic, Amazon Web Anal-
ysis, and Similarweb. It is important to mention that the graph that been generated here
are using the web access records for the visits counting, and using the average number of
internet users based on the geographic area such as the zip code.
Figure 10: Number of estimated visits for the last 30 days
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Figure 11: Number of page views per user for the last three months
Figure 12: ODPs visitors average age for the last three months
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Figure 13: ODPs traffic sources for the last three months
5.1 Open Data Platforms and Data Formats
The OPDs analyzed in our study are using third-party cloud SaaS services that are
Socrata and CKAN. Each is providing a set of features for the ODP administrators to pro-
vide different features to the ODP users. We found that Socrata is the most used platform
among these ODPs. Boston is using most of Socrata’s platform features such as the differ-
ent illustration methods such as tables, maps, graphs and almost all the common used big
data formats, such as CSV, Excel, JSON, RDF, RSS, XML, JSON API connection. How-
ever Pittsburgh is using CKAN platform and they are hosting and managing their data in
University of Pittsburgh campus, so it is one of if the uncommon ODPs cases where the
cities are using others clouds infrastructure [21]. Other open data portal platforms are
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used by many other ODPs such as DKAN, Junar, OpenDataSoft, etc. In fact, all the men-
tioned ODP platforms and others are using Amazon AWS IaaS and IaaS cloud services
[1]. These platforms are providing very detailed and well-organized documentation for
their platforms for web and application developers.
5.2 Number of Datasets
The datasets refer to data contents and their classification available in ODPs. Each
dataset contains open data related to any particular categories such as traffic, housing,
health and 311 calls. The number of datasets of each ODPs are summarized in Figure 14.
5.3 Population Vs Number of The Visits
It is very expected that the city of a high population will provide more data than
the cities of lower populations. We found this is not true for two main reasons. First,
some big cities donaˆt provide a sufficient information grouping, so they release the data
in very big general sets (very general classification). The second reason is that some big
cities donaˆt publish or utilize the data they are collecting in an efficient way, sometimes
for privacy and security reasons and/or because they lack to use the efficient open data
framework and portal. All the references for these data can be found in the extension
report of our work. Our results are concluded in Figure 15.
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Figure 14: Number of datasets available of different cities
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Figure 15: Number of ODP visits per city population
By knowing and understanding the ODP, it is very useful to design, customize, and
set the performance metrics of the ODP so that it serves the highest percentage of their
visitors. Such as adding tools that the visitor would be comfortable with (sophisticated or
basic), using the right load balancing if a high volume of requests occurred. Enriching the
most used datasets and keywords and give them a priority in updating and provide them
with more customizable search, filtration, and illustration.
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CHAPTER 6
PRIVACY ISSUE ANALYSIS
As the smart cities experience is being more mature and expand to be involved in
more services, the number of the sensing points will increase, therefore the amount of the
collected data increase with a variety of types. Sensors can be cameras, motion sensors,
light sensors. Data can be gathered in other ways such as from the Wi-Fi servers, police
reports, etc. Most of these data sources are containing private and/or sensitive information
such as locations, addresses, pictures, network access information, etc. Therefore, citizens
are concerned about who is controlling these sensors, how is the data is being stored and
for how long, and many other questions. From that, it is important to find out if the smart
city system is privacy compliant or not, and if not, then to what extent. The main and
most common source of this data is the ODP, so we studied these cities to see how they
are maintaining the data privacy.
6.1 Privacy Metrics Analysis
The metrics we tested include: Cookies, SSL, Encryption, Privacy Policy Disclo-
sure. The grading criteria were ’0’ for not present or could not find the research method-
ology to ’4’ that is equivalent to the best standard found or moving in that direction.
The finding from this table is cities with higher security has more privacy compliance.
For example, Chicago has security evaluation 82 and privacy compliance 8, on the other
hand, Dubai has security evaluation 27 and privacy compliance as 4. Our findings are
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Figure 16: PII (complete addresses - blurred for privacy) in 311 call data from KC-ODP
summarized in Table 2.
6.2 PII Filtration Issue
An important privacy issue is sensitive data exposure such as Personal Identifiable
Information (PII), as we find many incidents of PII (i.e. personal full address) exposed
to the public on the ODP (Figure 16). The study proposing a real-time filtration tool to
filter all such sensitive information based on the patterns and machine learning to operate
within a specified identification (or detection) confidence level, other than the field or
content matching [13].
We found the need for a specialized tool that can filter the private information in
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an effective way in ODP. Though police crime reports are handled by the police depart-
ment and most cases information are not transferred to open data portal, however, city
government receives calls from citizens regarding neighborhood complaints, sometimes
the records contain their private information online on the ODP. In an explanation for
these mistakes, we found that person who is reporting, add their personal information in
a field which is not supposed to be filtered. In Figure 16 shows in Kansas City ODP 311
data has full address information (for privacy reason addresses are blurred here). These
situations do not have an effective solution rather than removing the private data manu-
ally, which would a failure for ODP. We developed a real-time filtration tool that is able to
distinguish the PII information pattern rather than discovering it by the exact match. This
tool is developed and tested using JSON files that contain name, email address etc. The
tool can be found in Github [13].
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CHAPTER 7
CONCLUSION AND FUTURE WORK
7.1 Summary
In this study, we have evaluated the current status of ODPs in multiple cities
around the world. Many cities collect and publish data for transparency, attracting busi-
nesses and solving important issues such as traffic, security, and utility service quality.
However, our study indicates that these cities do not have these high expected data records
that should meet their sizes and need. Another concern is the ability to maintain the pri-
vacy and security of these data that keep on increasing over time. The security risk grows
significantly as the smart services are using these data over different parties. Therefore,
the challenge is to balance between the utility of smart services and the data security. Pri-
vacy protection is also one of the growing concern in ODP systems. We developed a tool
to identify and filter PII from the raw data before it is published in the portal. While our
tool identifies PII such as name, email address, phone number, further studies and devel-
opments are needed to identify other private information such as in images, locations, and
networking logs through more sophisticated intelligent algorithms.
Constant penetration testing, network security (fast scanners for ports, encapsu-
lation, protocols flags, congestion control, etc.) are effective security practices that can
maintain a secure system. Further, a simple and trivial ends connected to a sophisticated
and more intelligent core is a networking system design that is proofed to be efficient and
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adopted by Software Defined Networks (SDN) systems to limit the sensitive controlling
data within specific traffic area, which can be considered as sensitive data traffic isolation.
A solution for identification and authentication security issue in the smart city environ-
ment is to implement a smart city security system that can adapt to the need of blockchain
methodology, as its substantially lower-cost solutions can be instantiated, which can dis-
rupt existing business models, offering a secure authentication transaction sessions.
7.2 Technical Enhancements and Educational institutions involvement
These big cities are expected to have the highest open data portal visits and data
sets classification because the number of the studies and analysis should be higher to
satisfy their need. However, our study indicates that these cities do not have these high
expected records that should meet their sizes and need. In this direction, many suggestions
can participate in better open data utilization such as apply multiple enhancements to
the open data portal such as provide a higher level of search, sort, classification, and
more user-friendly design. Another thing is by involving the educational researchers and
institutions to make more analysis and research to solve any of the common issues of the
big cities. In addition to this, we found that many of the open data portals do not keep
records for their open data portals such as the visits numbers, visitors locations, and so
on. this information is important in evaluating the portal performance and accessibility.
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7.3 Multi-vendors and Unified Policies
Another point is that we found that is almost most of the US open data portals are
using Socrata as database platform provider. Few among them are using either their own
data solution or using other database platform providers, as shown in Table.1. The issue
here is the data privacy and security especially when it comes to smart cities that have
many different vendors are involved in that. In the most cases, the data ownership is not
clear. Furthermore, it is almost impossible to find a unified privacy or security policies
applied. Our other research is on the track to solve this issue in a collaboration of the
school of computing and engineering and Law school of University of Missouri Kansas
City which aims to provide a unified security and privacy gauging tool for any smart city
open data portal.
The open data field is a huge promising field and many research is going in many
of its directions. Mainly how to unleash the powerful information in this data and how
to utilize it. The other direction is the expected coming issue is how to maintain the
privacy and security of this data as it is in a rapid increase and its value is increasing
with time. The security risk is increasing as the smart services that are using this data is
increasing. Therefore, a very rich direction is how to deal with the tradeoffs between the
smart services and the securing them.
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APPENDIX A
SECURITY COMPARISON RANKING DATA FOR ALL CITIES
Ten smart cities ODP’s security evaluation The OPD’s security evaluation parame-
ters are provided in detail in the following table. Further, an explanation for the evaluation
for each parameter is discussed too.
Table 3: Ten smart cities ODP’s security evaluation
City CSP Cookies CORS HTTP PKP STS Redir Pref Pol SI XCTO XFO X-XSS-Prot
Chicago 0 10 10 10 0 10 10 10 10 10 10
Kansas City 0 10 10 10 0 0 10 10 0 0 0
Los Angeles 0 10 10 10 0 10 10 0 10 10 10
New York 0 10 10 10 0 10 10 10 10 10 10
Washington DC 0 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10
Casablanca 0 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10
Bercelona 0 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10
Dubai 0 0 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10
Seoul 0 5 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10
London 0 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10
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APPENDIX B
SECURITY COMPARISON FIGURES FOR ALL CITIES
All the cities comparison figures are provided in this appendix. It is important here
to mention that the spider figure is used for illustration purpose only and the area under
the spider net does not refer to the security rank or the metric value. The most important
thing in this illustration is the values of each metric that is represented by the ends of the
spider metric. It also illustrates the variations of security metrics values among the cities.
Figure 17: Los Angeles
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Figure 18: New York
Figure 19: Washington DC
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Figure 20: Casablanca
Figure 21: Barcelona
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Figure 22: Seoul
Figure 23: London
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